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Virtually every recent report or study describes women's progress in
achieving greater representation on corporate boards of directors as "stalled"
or some similar adjective. 2

The low number of women in the corporate

boardrooms of U.S. public companies has "stayed more or less the same,
with small variations from year to year."3

In light of the increased presence

Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati
College of Law.

This essay was prepared in connection with the University of Dayton School of Law's

Symposium on Perspectives on Gender and Business Ethics: Women in Corporate Governance, which
was held on February 25, 2011.

Marli Schippers, Corporate Law Fellow and UC Law Class of 2012,

provided research assistance.
2See,

e.g., Korn/Ferry Institute,

34th Annual Board of Directors Study, 4 (Dec.

18, 2008),

http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdfl/BoardStudy07_LoRezFINAL pdf ("stalled"); Charged
for Boardroom Change, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK, http://www.ionwonmen.org/about-usfabout-us
(last visited July 20, 2011) ("stagnant"); Press Release, Latest Catalyst Census Shows Women Still Not
Scaling the Corporate Ladder in 2010; New Study Indicates Clue to Reversing Trend (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.catalyst.org/press-release/1 81/latest-catalyst-census-shows-wornen-still-not-scaling-thePress Release,
("stagnation");
corporate-ladder-in-20 10-new-study-indicates-clue-to-reversing-trend
2020 Women on Boards Forms Grassroots Campaign to Increase Women on Corporate Boards (Nov. 26,
2010), http://www.2020wob.com/news-and-resources/press-releases ("static") [hereinafter 2020 Women
on Boards]. But see Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How
Much Difference Does Djfference Make? 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No.
89, 2010) (stating that women's share of new board appointments spiked in 2009 when 39% of 424 new

director appointments were women).
Guys Who Get It: Business Leaders Who Understand the Value of Diversity at the Top, The 6th
'
Annual Status Report of Women Directors and Executive Officers of Public Companies in Fourteen
Regions

of

the

United

States,

INTERORGANIZATION
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NETWORK,

3

(Mar.

2010),

8
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of women in the workplace and the failure of initiatives to date, it is time to
consider what additional efforts could be taken to improve the status quo. 4
THE PRESENT

I.

A.

The Numbers

Women comprise slightly more than one-half of the U. S . population
and control 76% of U.S. consumer purchasing power.s Wome n account for
46.7% of the U.S. labor force and 51.5% of management, professional, and

related occupations. 6

Yet women held only 14.4% of executive officer

positions and 15.7% of board seats on Fortune 500 companies in 2O10.
Women
Moreover, the numb4
of female CEOs was similarly small.
er

accounted for only 2.8% of CEOs at Fortune 500 companies.8

There were

fourteen female CEOs at Fortune 500 companies and nineteen female CEOs
at Fortune 501-1000 companies. 9

In 2010, women executive officers held

7.6% of top earner positions at Fortune 500 companies.1 0
Sixty Fortune 500 companies had zero women directors in 2010.11
Only 57% of S&P 500 companies had at least two female directors, and
only 19% had more than two. 1 2 Only seventy-two Fortune 500 companies
had 25% or more women directors.'3

Progress at smaller, less visible public

companies has been even slower. Only 60% of companies comprising the
Russell 3000, and only half of the Russell 2000 companies, had at least one

female director.' 4

http://www.ionwomen.org/wp-contentuploads/2010/12/ION_Report
web_032210.pdf; see also Missing
Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards, ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, 4 (2010),
http://theabd.org/Missing Pieces Women andMinorities onFortune 500_Boards.pdf
(stating
that
from 2004 to 2010 the increase in women's board seats was "not appreciable").
"
This essay addresses only gender diversity, in keeping with the Symposium's theme. It must be
acknowledged, however, that the lack of racial and ethnic diversity on corporate boards is also a serious
problem.
* Virtcom Consulting, Board Diversification
Shareowner

Value,

CALPERS,

8 (2008),

Strategy: Realizing Competitive

Advantage

and

http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-

corp/diversification-strategy.pdf.
6 US. Women in Business, CATALYST (Aug. 2011), http://www catalyst.org/publication/132/uswomen-in-business.
Id.
6

1Id.

* Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000, CATALYST (Sept. 201 1), http://www catalyst.org/publication/
322 /women-ceos-of-the-fortune- 1000.
10
Rachel Scares et al., 2010 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Executive Officers and Top
1 (2010), htt://www.catalyst.org/file/412/2010
us census women executive_
Earners, CATALYST,
offi cers and top earners final.pdf.
"
See Rachel Soares et al.,

CA2TALYST,

1

(2010),

2010 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors,
http://www.catalyst.org/file/413/2010 us census women board directors

finl.dfAnnalisa Barrett, Uneven Progress: Female Directors in the
Russell 3000, THE CORPORATE
LIBRARY, I1(2010), http://info.thecorporatelibrary.com/Portals/30022/docs/unpris_1femaledirectors.pdf.
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Moreover,

women

directors

do

not

9

BOARDS

DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE

generally

hold

leadership

positions on boards. There were only fourteen S&P 500 companies with
female board chairs.'5 "Only forty-five S&P 500 companies ha~d] women
chairing their compensation committees, 58 ha[d] female audit committee
chairs, and 75 ha[d] women leading their nominating committees."'
Very
few of the S&P 500 companies had women serving in two or more positions
of responsibility.1

Contrast

these

statistics

with

the

fact

in

that

2010

women

constituted a majority of the Commissioners at the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), including the Chair.1 8 Can anyone argue seriously
that there are not additional well-qualified women to participate in corporate
America?
B. PrivateInitiatives

The

slow

progress

toward

making

boardroom

the

more

representative of the workforce is not for lack of attention to the issue fr-om
the private sector.
A number of well-respected organizations expend
considerable resources on efforts to improve diversity, including the

Alliance for Board Diversity ("ABD"),' 9 Catalyst, 2 0 the InterOrganization
Network ("ION"), 2

1

and the DirectWomen Initiative.22

A new initiative,

2020 Women on Boards, announced that it aimed to raise the percentage of

16

Id
Id

IS

Chair Mary L. Schapiro (since 2009), Elisse B. Walter (since 2008), and Kathleen L. Casey

"

(2006-2011).
EXCHANGE

SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners,
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm

U.S.
(last

SECURITIES AND
visited

Sept.

5,

2011).
The Alliance for Board Diversity ("ABD") is a collaboration of four leadership organizations that
have a common goal to increase equitable representation of women and minorities on corporate boards.
About the Alliance Board for Diversity, ALLIAN4CE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, http:7/theabd.org/index.html
'*

(last visited Sept. 15, 2011).

The four organizations are Catalyst, The Executive Leadership Council, the
Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility, and Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. Id.
20
Catalyst is a leading nonprofit membership organization that studies women and men across
levels, functions, and geographies to learn about women's experiences in business, barriers to their career
advancement, and individual and organizational strategies leading to success.

About Us, CATALYST,

http://www.catalyst.org/page/59/about-us (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
21
Formed in 2004, ION consists of fifteen regional organizations in the United States. Charged for
Boardroom Change, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK, http://www.ionwomen.org/about-us (last visited
Sept. 15, 2011). It represents more than 10,000 women in business across a wide range of industries that
advocate for the advancement of women to positions of power in the business world, especially to boards
of directive and executive suites. Id.
"The centerpiece of the DirectWomen initiative is the DirectWomen Board Institute, an annual
two-day program providing a free orientation and update on key issues facing current and fixture
directors. The goal is to position an elite group of exceptional senior women lawyers for service as
22

directors of major U.S.

corporations." Direct Women

Board Institute

http://directwomen.org/institute/ (last visited Sept. 15, 201 1).
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women on corporate boards in the U.S. to 20% or greater by 2020.23
Executive search firms and consulting firms have issued reports on the
issue.2

Institutional investors advocate for greater gender diversity.

For

example, California Teachers' Retirement System ("CalSTRS") announced
that increasing board diversity was one of its goals in the 2011 proxy season
and that it planned to submit proposals asking companies with little or no

board diversity to ensure that women and minority candidates were included
in their pools of nominees.25

The California Public Employees' Retirement

System ("CalPERS") recognizes

the importance of diversity on boards,

particularly to address historically under-represented groups, including
women and minorities. 2 6 Further, CaISTRS and CalPERS are working with
a panel of leading corporate governance experts to create a digital database
aimed at increasing board diversity." The Diverse Director DataSource
("3D") aspires to provide a place for companies to recruit qualified, diverse
individuals. 2 8
Finally, Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS"), the
influential proxy advisory firm, is generally supportive of proposals that
request reports on the company's efforts to diversify the board.2 9
In addition to attention by institutional investors, many respected
legal scholars have studied the issue, including my fellow presenters on this
program, Douglas M. Branson,3 o Joan MacLeod Heminway, 3 ' and Darren
Rosenbaum. 3 2 Other law schools have previously held symposia that have

23

2020 Women on Boards, supra note 2.

24

See, e.g., Korn/Ferry Institute, supra note 2, at 4, 6 (analyzing the stalled progress of women and

minorities on corporate bord)

Vi-team

Consulting,

supra note

5, at

1 ("In terms of gender

representation, corporate boards are still quite clearly behind.").
25
Rosemary Lally ed., Quarterly Governance Update, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/council%20governan ce%20alert/
2010%20Archive/2010%20Alert%2046.pdf; see also Press Release, Cal. State Teachers' Retirement
Sys.,

CaISTRS

Continues

to

Advance

Diversity

on

Corporate

http://www.calstrs.com/inewsroom2011/news0712ll.aspx.
26
Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance

§§

Boards
2.2,

(July

2.4 (2010),

12,

2011),

available

at

http://www.calpers-governance.org/does-sof/principles/201I0-5-2-global-principles-of-accountable-corp-

govydf.
Press Release, Cal. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., CalSTRS, CalPERS, Announce Diverse
Director DataSource (3D) - A Resource to Identify Corporate Director Candidates (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.calstrs.com/newsroom2011/news04051I.aspx.
28
Id.
29

2011 US. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary, INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS. INC., 62 (Jan.
2011),

27,
30

available

at

http://wwwissgovernance.com/files/ISS2011lUSPolicySummaryGuidelines

Mr. Branson has authored No SEAT AT THE TABLE:

HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KEEPS

WOMEN OUT OF AMERICA'S BOARDROOMS (2007) and THE LAST MALE BASTION: GENDER AND THE

CEO SUITE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC COMPANIES (2010).
31
Ms. MacLeod Heminway has authored Sex,

HeinOnline -- 37 U. Dayton L. Rev. 10 2011-2012

Trust, and Corporate Boards,

18 HASTINGS

11

STALLED: GENDER DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS

2011]

produced significant scholarship addressing the issue. 3 3

C. Government Initiatives (or Lack Thereof)
In contrast to these efforts by advocacy groups, investors, and
academics, the federal government has largely failed to address the lack of
The SEC's recent adoption of a disclosure

diversity on corporate boards.

inaction.
1. Congress
Because

discrimination

Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
dir ectors are outside its
only against emplo 'yees 4
While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Title VII of the C

~ivil

protections.3 5
Protection Act requires the SEC to create and staff an Office of Minority
and Women Inclusion to, among other things, "assess[] the diversity policies
and practices of entities regulated by the agency[,]"3 6 the statute expressly
*

I

3

1~

*

y

does not give tne SEC autnority to require diversity measures.
In any
event, the SEC has deferred creating and staffing this office due to budget
uncertainty. 3 8
2. Treasury
The executive branch failed to use opportunities presented by the
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") to improve the diversity on
boards. As a result of the TARP bailouts of five corporations, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury became a controlling shareholder and had the
opportunity to select or significantly influence the appointment of directors
at these corporations. 3 9 By reason of its holdings of preferred shares in a

nSee, e.g., Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Board Diversity and CorporatePerformance, 89
N.C. L. REV. 715, 715-1082 (2011); Rhode & Packel, supra note 2, at 1; Jayne W. Barnard, More
Wornen on CorporateBoards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703, 703-06 (2007); Lisa
Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the
Unigue Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1105,1I105-07 (2005).
4Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
1ARTHUR LARSON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.05 (2d ed. 2008) (citing to
36Dodd-Frank

Wall

Street

Reform

and Consumer Protection

Act,

Pub.

L. No.

Ill1-203,

342(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1541 (2010).
nSee id. § 342(b)(4) (stating that it should not be construed "to require any specific action based on
the findings of the assessment").
38

on

See Memorandum from H. David Kotz, Inspector GJen., to the Honorable Barbara Lee, Subcomm.

Fin.

Senvs.

and

Gen.

Gov't

(June

15,

2011),

available at

http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/

Auditslnspections/201 1/Report 6l 1l.pdf.
* See Barbara Black, The US. as "Reluctant Shareholder": Govemnment, Business and the Law, 5
ENTREPRENEUR BUS. L.J. 561, 562 (2010) (discussing the government's actions as controlling
shareholder).
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number of other corporations, the Treasury has the power to appoint
directors under certain circumstances, as when the corporation misses at
The Treasury has never
payments. 4 0
discussed what attributes it deems important in filling directorships at these
least

six

consecutive

dividend

but their actions do not suggest
important consideration.
failed companies,

that diversity is an

As a result of TARP financing, the Treasury controls American
International Group, Inc. ("AIG"), and has the power to elect all of its

directors.41

At AIG, aside from the CEO, seven directors elected by
shareholders at the 2010 shareholders meeting joined the board after
September 2008.42 Six of the seven are men; the median age is sixty-four.
Six are retired CEOs or other senior management; one is currently senior
management. The median service on other boards is two. Two additional
directors appointed directly by the Treasury because of its preferred share

holdings are both retired, male CEOs of approximately the same age. 4 3
In July 2009, as a result of TARP financing, the Treasury owned
33.6% common-stock interest in Ciiru; in 2010, the Treasury began to
sell off its common-stock holdings and, as of December 31, 2010, no longer
owned common stock.45 At Citigroup, since the bailout through the 2010
annual meeting, eight new independent directors were elected to the board.
Seven of them are male and the median age is sixty-three; four are retired
CEOs, two are current CEOs or senior management, one is an academic, and
one is the former President of Mexico. The median number of other boards
they serve on is two.4

6

When GM and Chrysler emerged from bankruptcy in mid-2009, the
Treasury had the power, because of its investments in each company, to

designate a total of fourteen directors.4 7
40

The Treasury engaged a search firm to identify' candidates and has interviewed possible directors.

Quarterly Report to Congress, OFFICE
RELIEF

PROGRAM,

201 1/April2011
'"

"Eleven of the fourteen directors

106

(Apr.

28,

OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET

2011),

available

at

http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/

Qurel

eot oCnrs
d[hereinafter SIGTARP].
Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Proxy Statement 9-10 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 4, 2011), available at

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/S272/OOO093041 311 002523/c64660_defl 4a.htm#c64660
relationships 1 [hereinafter AIG Proxy Statement].
42
Black, supra note 39, at 580. At the 2011 shareholders meeting, two new directors were elected,
both of whom are men. American Int'l (AIG) Has Selected Two New Directors, STREETINSIDER (Mar.
http://www.streetinsider.com/Management+Changes/American+Intl+%28AIG%29+Hlas+
11,
2011),
Selected+Two+New+Directors/63622 19.html.
't
Black, supra note 39, at 580. In 2011, the shareholders elected these two directors because the
Treasury's preferred shares were converned to common stock. AIG Proxy Statement, supra note 41, at
11.
"
as

46
'"

Black, supra note 39, at 573.

SIGTARP, supra note 40, at 119.
Black, supra note 39, at 586.
Id at 589. The Treasury's equity holdings in each company have subsequently been reduced.
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Five [were] current CEOs or senior

[were] men; the median age [was] 60.

management, seven [were] retired CEOs or senior management, two [were]
acadeics .. .. The median number of other boards [was] between one and
two .""
At Ally, formerly known as GMAC, the government has appointed

four directors. 4 9

Three are men and the median age is sixty-one; one is

currently a CEO, one is an investment banker, and two are executives in
private equity firms.5 0

In short, the directors

at the corporations in which the U.S.
government was a controlling shareholder were a very homogeneous group
who fit the template of the independent director in a publicly traded
corporation: a predominately white, male cohort of retired CEOs who also
serve on several other corporate boards.
3. SEC
In December 2009, the SEC adopted a number of amendments to
the proxy disclosure rules, including amendments that require companies to

set forth information for each director and nominee about that person's
specific qualifications for membership on the company's
addition, Rule 407(c)(2)(vi) requires companies to:
Describe

.

.whether,

board.5 1

In

and if so how, the nominating

conmmittee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying
nominees for director. If the nominating committee (or the
board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of
diversity in identifying director nominees, describe how this
policy is implemented,

as well as how the nominating

committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its
policy([.J

52

The SEC had not included a required disclosure about diversity in
its initial proposal, but requested comments on whether the SEC should
amend

the

rules

to

require

disclosure

of additional

factors

nominating committee should consider, such as board diversity.5 3

that

the

The SEC

Black, supra note 39, at 589.

48

SIGTARP, supra note 40, at 163.
5o
Black, supra note 39, at 592 (reporting information as to the first three directors appointed by the
Treasury); Press Release, Treasury Names Appointee to Ally Board of Directors (Feb. 28, 2011),
http ://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl1080.aspx
(reporting information as to
49~

fourth director).
SI

r~cn

----

u.,,

.n

~

i

52

rroxy Rule 401(e), 17/ C.F.R. 9 229.401(e)
Id. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi).

*

Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076, 35,084 (July 17, 2009).

See SECt

(2011).
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stated that it was "interested in understanding whether investors and other
market participants believe that diversity in the boardroom is a significant
issue." 5 4

A number of commenters responded that disclosure about board

diversity was important information to investors and that it would provide
investors with information about corporate culture and governance practices
that would allow investors to make more informed voting decisions.5 5

In the

Final Release, the SEC "agree[d] that it is usefuil for investors to understand
how the board considers and addresses diversity, as well as the board's
assessment

of the

implementation

of its

diversity

policy,

if any."5

Moreover, "[a]lthough the amendments are not intended to steer behavior,

diversity policy disclosure may also induce beneficial changes in board
Nominating committees might, for example, conduct
composition." 7
broader searches that would improve director quality or result in directors
with fewer ties to the board or management and greater independence.5
The SEC, however, did not define diversity because it:
recognize[s] that companies may define diversity in various
ways, reflecting different perspectives.

For instance, some

companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to
include differences of viewpoint, professional experience,
education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes
that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may

focus

on diversity

national origin.

concepts

such as race,

[The SEC] believe[s] that

.

gender
. .

and

companies

should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they
consider appropriate. 5 9
What
statements?

is the track record

to

date

after

cycles of proxy
The results to date are disappointing for anyone who expected
two

that boards would become more transparent in addressing their commitment
to gender diversity. 6 0 An SEC staff review of disclosures found deficiencies
in two primary areas.
Some companies took the position that the rule

required disclosure only if companies had a formal diversity policy and did

54

Id

ssProxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009).
5 6 Id
"

Id. at 6 8,35 5.

ss

Id.

Id. at 68,344.
60
See Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm'r, Keynote Speech by SEC Commissioner: Still Fighting for
Inclusion and Equal Opportunity (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
201 1/spchO421 1llaa.htm (stating that "many companies can do better"); Elisse B. Walter, SEC Comm 'r
59

Remarks at the DirectWomen Board Institute (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speechI201 1/spcbO2I0l lebw-2.htm (stating that "the corporate track record for disclosure under
this new requirement is quite spotty so far").

An EDGAR search located eighty-five

HeinOnline -- 37 U. Dayton L. Rev. 14 2011-2012
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not apply if its policy was informal.6 ' Other companies disclosed they had a
policy; however, these companies failed to disclose how they evaluated its
effectiveness. 6 2 These findings are consistent with my own limited review
of the proxy disclosures of a number of Fortune 500 companies, including
those of the ten companies that have both women CEOs and 25% or more
women directors,6 3 since these companies may be expected to exhibit best

practices. None of them stated that it had a formal policy on diversity.
Diversity was most commonly described as diversity of backgrounds, skills,
Furthermore, several did not explicitly
expenences, and perspectives.
identify gender as a factor of diversity. After personal attributes (integrity,
independence, etc.), business expertise was most frequently identified as
important.

The discussions about the importance of diversity are even more

abbreviated or formulaic at companies with zero women directors, the group
of companies that we might hope would recognize the need to change.
D. The Exchanges CorporateGovernance Standards

At least since 2004, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and
NASDAQ are the regulators principally responsible for establishing
corporate governance standards with respect to the companies listed for
trading on their exchanges.? In 2002, the SEC' s Chairman asked them to
review their corporate governance standards in light of the Enron/Worldcom

failures.

NYSE subsequently proposed, and the SEC approved, Section

303A of the NYSE Listed Company's Manual, which requires that listed
companies have a majority of independent directors. 5 Other requirements
include an independent nominating committee, 6 6 which is responsible for

61Luis

A. Aguilar, SEC Comm'r, Keynote Speech at 2011 Hispanic Association of Corporate

Responsibility-Corporate Directors Summit: An Update on Diversity and Financial Literacy (Apr. 30,
20 11), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/201l1/spch0430 1l1laa.htm.
62
Id
63

Avon

Products, Proxy Statement 8, 16 (Form DEE 14A) (March 25, 2010); Xerox, Proxy
Statement 9, 13 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 8, 2010); WellPoint, Inc., Proxy Statement 11, 17 (Form DEF
14A) (Apr. 2, 2010); PepsiCo, Inc., Proxy Statement 12, 17 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23, 2010); ArcherDaniels-Midland Co., Proxy Statement 4, S (Form DEF 14A) (Sept. 24, 2010); BJ's Wholesale Club,
Proxy Statement 4, 6 (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 16, 2010); Sunoco, Inc., Proxy Statement 3, 5 (Form DEF
14A) (Mar. 17, 2010); E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Proxy Statement 12, 21 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar.
19, 2010); Reynolds Am., Inc., Proxy Statement 9, 22 (Form DEE 14A) (Mar. 22, 2010); TJX Co. Inc.,
Proxy Statement 4--6 (Form DEE 14A) (Apr. 28, 2010).
64
See ABA, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57
BUS. LAW. 1487, 1553 (2002) (explaining that corporate governance listing standards fill a gap between
state corporate law and federal securities laws in matters of concern to the exchanges).
6s
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A (2009), available at http://nysemanuaI.nyse.com/
LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?scarched=1 &selectednode-chp%5F1%5F4%5F3%5Fl&CiRestriction=
303A&manual-%/2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F;

NYSE Listed Company Manual

§5605

(2006), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_ listing reqfees.pdf.
"
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.04. NASDAQ requires that independent directors select,
or recommend to the full board for their selection, nominees for directors, either through a nominating
committee or by executive session. NASDAQ Listing Rules § 5605(d)-e).
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identifying qualified board candidates consistent with criteria approved by
the board,6 7 and an independent audit committee whose m embers are
financially Iliterate and one of whom must have accounting or related

financial-management expertise. 6 8

These provisions are, according to the

NYSE, "designed to further the ability of honest and well-intentioned
directors, officers, and employees . . . to perform their functions effectively
[and to] allow shareholders to .

. ..

. .

monitor the performance of companies

and directors in order to reduce instances of lax and unethical behavior." 6 9
Although the focus of the corporate governance standards was on
fraud

prevention, some held out
encourage boards to engage in
independent directors that, in turn,
election of more female directors.7 0o
small gains.

71

the

a

hope that the standards would
wider search for well-qualified,

would result in the nomination and
To date, at least, the evidence shows

Neither the NYSE nor NASDAQ has any listing standards

seriously considered adoption of any such standards. 7 2
F. Explanations

Why has progress toward greater female representation on boards
stalled? Professor Jayne Barnard posits a number of reasons, including "the

desire to maintain social comfort levels and board cohesion, narrow search
criteria and procedures for selecting new directors, skepticism about the socalled 'business case' in favor of appointing women to corporate boards,

and plain old-fashioned sex discrimination." 7 3
fI

addition, many businesses do not believe that diversity is "a
"74
business imperative.
In the post-financial crisis world, where businesses
are under increasing pressure from a number of fronts to improve their

bottom line, increasing diversity may simply not be a business priority.
67

NYSE Listed Company Manual

§

303A.04(b)(1).

Apart from the requirement of a written

charter the Rule does not impose requirements on the process used by the committee in identi1~ying
candidates. See id.
68
NYSE Listed Company Manual
NASDAQ's comparable standard is NASDAQ
I 303A.07.
Listing Rules § 5605(c).
69
NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, SEC Ret. No. 34-48745, 81
SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003).
70
See Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Comm'r, Remarks Before the 2005 Colloquium for Women
Directors: Board Diversity: The 21st Ce~ntury Challenge "The New Regulatory Climate and Impact on
Board
Composition"
(Nov.
11,
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
at
available
2005),
spchllll0l5cag.htm.
n' Between 2004 and 2010, women gained a total increase of 1.1 percentage points on Fortune 100
boards. Alliance for Board Diversity, Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards,
CATALYST, 4 (July 21, 2011), http://www.catalyst.org/file/469/abd_2010_census.pdf.
72

Although three comimenters to the NYSE 2002 proposal recommended adding considerations

such as ethnic and gender diversity to the discussion of independence, it is not discussed in the Final
Release. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, SEC Rel. No. 34-48745, 81
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Finally, corporate America may have embraced the trend toward facially
neutral policies as the fair approach to find the best candidates. 7 5
IL
.

WHAT NEXT?

SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar, who has been in the forefront of
advocating for increased board diversity, posits that what is missing is "the
will to act." 7 6

issuers?

'What additional initiatives could be pursued to motivate

This section considers three approaches, ranging from mild to

aggressive.
First, the SEC staff can rigorously review the required diversity
disclosures and provide comments to issuers on their deficiencies, in order
ensure that investors receive more mneaningflul information about
companies' diversity practices. This jaw-boning by the SEC staff may not

to

only improve disclosure of diversity practices, but also facilitate campaigns
In fact, SEC
Commissioner Aguilar has asked the SEC staff to monitor the situation.7

by institutional investors to improve board diversity. 7 7

This mild approach has the advantage of giving the SEC disclosure rules an
opportunity to work. Nevertheless, even if the disclosures become less
formulaic, this does not necessarily result in issuers improving the diversity
of their boards.
Two other approaches would require action on the part of the NYSE
and NASDAQ, consistent with their role as principal regulators of the

corporate governance standards of their listed companies. 7 9 The first is the
customary approach of the exchanges' convening a blue-ribbon panel of

industry leaders to develop best practices for improving board diversity.8
Although adoption of the standards would not be mandatory, issuers would

have to implement these best practices or explain why they have elected not
to do so ("comply-or-explain").

"
76

1

Adoption of diversity best practices

Cf James Fanto et al., Justiring Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REv. 901, 927 (2011).
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm'r, Board Diversity: Why It Matters and How to knprove It (Nov. 4,

2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch1l10410laa.htm.
n Institutional investors, however, have lost a potentially valuable look with the D.C. Circuit's
vacating the SEC rule affording shareholders proxy access in certain limited circumstances. See Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305, 201 1 WL 2936808 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011).
Aguilar, supra note 61.
'n
*

Absent Congressional authorization, the SEC's power to impose corporate governance standards

is limited. See Bus. Round table v. SEC, 905 F.2d 407, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding the Exchange Act

§

19() idnot confer authority on SEC to impose corporate governance listing standards on exchanges).
oSee, e.g., NYSE & NASD, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
ON

IMPROVING

THE

EFFECTIVENESS

OF

CORPORATE

AUDIT

COMMITTEES

(1999),

available

at

http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Blue_Ribbon_Panel.pdf (identifying experts in the field of corporate audit
committees).
81

See ABA, supra note 64, at 1490 (proposing a similar approach with respect to certain corporate

governance standards).
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would work in tandem with the SEC rule and should improve the quality of
disclosure because those best practices would be the benchmark for
assessing issuers' commitment to diversity.

Issuers could no longer refer

vaguely to informal policies that take into account diversity of backgrounds,
skills, experiences, and perspectives, or otherwise resort to vague or
boilerplate language
As a result, inve stors should have better information
~.

to assess the adequ iacy of the issuers' efforts. The expectations are that
adoption of best practices will cause boards to examine critically their
current practices and that issuers woul ld be reluctant to deviate from best
practices unless they had good reason Ito believe their practices were better
fashioned I to find the best nominees for their board.
Unfortunately,
however, these expectations may not be met, especially f issuers do not
recognize the value of the best practices or a diversified board.
A

final

approach

is

suggested by recent speeches of SEC
Commissioner Luis Aguilar, in which he frequently cites as a laudable
example the adoption by the National Football League ("NFL") of the
Rooney Rule, which requires all NFL teams to interview at least one
minority candidate when filli ng a head coaching position. 8 2
Since the
Rooney Rule was adopted in 2003. 22% of head coaching positions have
been fil led with minorities? An import ant, if not the key, factor to the
success of the Rooney Rule is that it is mc re than an aspirational statement
of best practices.
An affinity group consisting of Afr-ican-American
coaches, scouts, and front-office officials monitors the efforts and notifies
the NFL if it suspects violations. 8 4 Failure to comply can result in hefty

fines.

5

Similarly, if a Rooney Rule for corporate boards is to have real
force, it must be a corporate governance rule with real consequences for
failure to comply. It is time for the NYSE and NASDAQ, as the institutions
principall y responsible for the corporate governance standards of the largest
publicly traded domestic issuers, seriously to consider adopting and
enforcing a rule that would require nominating committees to interview at
least one woman for each vacancy among the independent directors.

The

previousl'y identified leadership organizations and institutional investors
would continue their efforts to assist corporate boards in achieving more
diverse boards, as by identifying qualified candidates, but the exchanges
would provide the will to act in the form of an enforcement stick.8 6

See Aguilar, supra note 76. See N. JEREMI DURU, ADVANCING THE BALL: RACE, REFORMATION,
AND THE QUEST FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE NFL (2011), for background information and the
82

implementation of the Rooney Rule.
83Aguilar, supra note 76.
* DURU, supra note 82, at 143.
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Do the exchanges currently have the statutory authority to require
adoption of a Rooney Rule?

The legal limit of the exchanges' authority to
adopt rules on corporate governance matters is unclear.~ The Exchange Act
gives the exchanges broad authority to adopt rules, am 4ong other purposes,
and, in general, to
"to promote just and equitable principles of trade ...
hrases arecso vague
protect investors and the public interest,"8 8 but those p1
that they do not provide much guidance. Conversely, the rules cannot be
designed to regulate "matters no t related to the purposes of this ch apter" and

cannot be designed to permit ''unfair discrimination" between issuers. 8 9
Finally, the SEC shall approve an exchange's proposed rule if the agency
finds it "consistent with the requi rements of this chapter and the rules and
an

regulations thereunder applicable to such
ganizations.""Y
Conversely, it
shall disapprove the proposed rule if it does not make such a finding.91 Init
2003 approval of the NYSE/N 1ASDAQ( corporate governance listing
standards, the SEC emphasized the role (of good governance practices in
"maintain[ing] effective oversight of the re liability of corporate financial
information[,]"

consequently

"enhanc[ing]

investor

confidence

in

the

securities markets." 9 2

Some may argue that there is no statutory authority
for a mandatory exchange rule on diversity vwithout a stronger showing of a
connection between diversity and good corpc irate governance. Yet, the SEC
recognized in its adoption of a disclosure rule on diversity that many
investors care about diversity, and that efforts to increase diversity could
promote better board performance by improv ring both the qualifications and
the independence of directors.9

III.

REASONS FOR (CARING

Finally, why should we care about the abysmal lack of diversity in
corporate boardrooms? 9 4 Some advocates think it is necessary to advance
the business case that increased board diversity improves the corporate

Company Manual provides for a public reprimand letter as a lesser sanction to deter violations. NYSE
Listed Company Manual § 303A.13.
87ABA, supra note 64, at 1516.
88

89
90
~'

92

15 U.S.C.
Id
Id.

§78o-3

(2006).

§ 78s.

Id

Order Approving

NYSE

and NASDAQ

Proposed

Rule

Changes

Relating

to

Corporate

Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64, 175-76 (Nov. 12, 2003).
* Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009).
94
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm'r, Statement by SEC Commissioner:
The Abysmal Lack of
Diversity in Corporate Boardrooms is Growing Worse (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speechI2O1 1/spchO5021Illaa.htm.
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These assertions may be overstated, because, to date, the

empirical support for the proposition that increased board diversity improves
corporate performance is mixed.

While there are studies that find that

diversity improves board oversight, 9 6 Professor Rhode and Ms. Packel
recently reviewed empirical studies on the impact of diversity on corporate
financial performance, and concluded that the relationship between diversity
and

financial

However,

performance

has

not

been

convincingly

established. 9 7

do provide some support for the assertion that
diversity can improve decision-making and enhance the corporate image.9
the studies

Is it really necessary to make a business case to justif
efforts toward board diversity?9 9
The number of women,

increased
including

professional women, in corporate America, should put the onus on the

business community to explain their failures to nominate more female
candidates for board positions. It cannot be for lack of qualified women;
advocacy groups and institutional investors have redoubled their efforts to
develop talent banks for corporate America.ro
Perhaps the need for a

business justification

would

be

more persuasive if we had greater
confidence that current nomination practices achieved the objective of a
well-functioning board of directors.

Given the poor performance of the

boards of many leading financial institutions during the recent financial
crisis, it is hard to believe that the presence of more women in the
boardroom would have a deleterious effect on risk-management oversight,
to cite one egregious failing. In short, a business justification for increased
female representation on corporate boards hardly seems necessary.
To date, it is clear that relying on corporations, on their own, to
improve their track record on diversity has not significantly improved board

diversity.

Without more aggressive intervention, this will continue to be a

slog to equality. The lack of progress is profoundly discouraging for those
who believe in me ritocracy. This is an issue of equal opportunity.

e.g., Virtcom Consulting, supra note 5, at 14 ("Core business concepts such as competitive
advantage, organizational performance, creativity, innovation and shareowner value are the new talking
points linked to a diverse slate of board directors.").
96
See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. State Public Employees Retirement System, Diverse Corporate
Boards Achieve Higher Performance, CalPERS Report Says (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-archive/pr-2009/feb/diverse-boards-higher-performance.xml
(discussing a
asSee,

study that found that "[Iclompanies that have diverse boards perform better than those with similar
director profiles in terms of ethnicity, gender and skill sets").
* Rhode & Packel, supra note 2; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New
Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 856, 861-62 (2011) (reviewing the empirical evidence);
Fanto, supra note 75, at 918 (reviewing existing studies).
98
Rhode & Packel, supra note 2.
*

See Fanto, supra note 75, at 906 (arguing that diversity advocates
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